Traditional agency theory assumes that managers are egoistic and need incentives to act in the best interests of the firm. As such, agency theory is a key determinant of firm size, capital structure, corporate governance, and firm value. However, traditional theory ignores the fact that some people are virtuous and do not need such incentives. If some employees are selfless, diligent, and have a sense of public duty, then the predictions of agency theory may be quite different. In this paper, we use a simplified principal-agent framework to show that the virtuosity of managers indeed affects the firm's potential for growth, level of riskiness, and organizational structure. If a firm offers its managers a contract without incentives, it saves the cost of risksharing, but faces the risks of hiring egoistic agents who shirk or unskilled managers who cannot contribute to firm value. We derive the trade-offs that the firm faces when offering different employment contracts and show that these tradeoffs drive the firm's optimal growth strategy and organizational structure. Surprisingly, we show that when the managers are more virtuous, the firm optimally chooses to invest in low-growth, low-risk projects and establishes a horizontal organizational structure. With less dedicated (egoistic) agents, the firm optimally chooses risky, high-growth projects and establishes a hierarchy in the organization. The analysis in this paper implies that corporate culture and societal norms are important drivers of firm structure and value. * We would like to thank Alon Brav, Pino Lopomo, and David Robinson for helpful discussions at the inception of this project. Also providing useful comments and suggestions were Amil Dasgupta, Rich Mathews, Curtis Taylor, and seminar participants at Duke University. All remaining errors are of course the authors' responsibility.
Introduction
Ever since Berle and Means (1932) recognized that agency issues potentially destroy firm value, economists have focused on ways to mitigate the moral hazard problems that arise between shareholders and managers. Agency theory is now ubiquitous in corporate finance as it is an important determinant of firm size, capital structure, corporate governance, and firm value. 1
Traditionally, the theory of agency is founded on Adam Smith's principle that managers are egoistic and must be given incentives to assure that they act in the best interests of the firm and its shareholders. 2 The fact that society has ethical standards and people share common values has been largely ignored in this framework. 3 If some employees are selfless, diligent, and have a sense of public duty, then the predictions of agency theory may be quite different. We have known for a long time that the choices that people make are driven to some degree by ethical standards. As far back as Plato (in the Republic) and Aristotle (in Nicomachean Ethics), it was proposed that individuals in a civilized society often have a moral contract with themselves to perform their tasks well and derive satisfaction from being virtuous. Applying this to an agency framework, this means that if employees are virtuous, they internalize the costs of supplying effort when they accept a job and create a moral contract with themselves that leaves no room to renege on their duties. In essence, an agent's word is his bond to the principal, who can then rely on the agent's diligence.
Of course, people are heterogeneous on this dimension, as not everyone is virtuous. As we show in this paper, however, if firms consider the virtuosity of their employees when making strategic decisions, virtuosity impacts firm value in several important ways. Not only does the virtuosity of managers affect the employment contracts that the firm offers, but it also affects the expected growth, the riskiness and the organizational structure of the firm.
In this paper, we quantify the impact of employee virtuosity on firm value by considering the following important questions: When some managers at the firm are known to be virtuous, what types of employment contracts should shareholders offer them? When does risk-sharing become inefficient? How does the character of the manager affect the projects that the firm undertakes? Does the presence of ethical managers make screening for talent easier or harder? What is the optimal organizational structure of the firm when some managers are ethical?
To address these questions, we consider a principal-agent model in which agents may be either egoistic or virtuous. The egoistic agent is the "classic" manager who acts in his own best interest and requires incentives to exert high effort. The egoistic agent has both a participation and an incentive compatibility constraint. In contrast, the virtuous agent always exerts high effort and does not require extra incentives. This does not mean that virtuous agents give economic surplus away; rather they anticipate and internalize the fact that they will exert costly effort in some situations when it is not necessarily optimal for them to do so. As such, they charge the firm ex ante for this expected effort. From the firm's perspective, hiring a virtuous agent essentially amounts to hiring one whose incentive compatibility constraint is never binding. However, the participation constraint, which ensures that the ethical agent does not foolishly give up economic surplus, still has to be satisfied.
In equilibrium, the firm optimally offers an agent known to be virtuous a different employment contract than if he was egoistic. Since a virtuous agent lacks an incentive compatibility constraint, the firm can reduce the incentive portion of the compensation and offer a larger fixed-wage compensation (i.e., offer a flatter compensation contract), which saves the risk-neutral firm the costs of imposing compensation risk on a risk-averse agent. In this case, firm value increases and the virtuous agent is equally well-off (because his participation constraint must still be satisfied). First-best is achieved and the firm captures the increase in surplus. With an egoistic agent, the firm cannot offer such a contract as the agent would shirk and decrease the probability that the firm's endeavors are successful.
In our model, the firm does not know ex ante whether the agent is virtuous or egoistic because the agent's morality is private information. A virtuous agent cannot credibly signal that they will always exert high effort. The firm also faces an adverse selection problem based on the skill of the agent. So, agents can be skilled or unskilled, and virtuous or egoistic. We show that firms may use incentive-based contracts to screen for skill and make sure that they are hiring managers who can improve firm value. This is not possible with a fixed-wage contract, however. In this case, all types of workers will accept the compensation contract and the firm cannot assure that they get skilled workers.
Therefore, when the firm chooses the optimal employment contract to offer an agent, it faces a tradeoff. Contracts that rely on agents' ethics (i.e., flat contracts or ethics-based contracts) have better risk-sharing properties, whereas incentive-based contracts screen out unskilled workers and motivate the skilled, egoistic workers to exert effort. There exist conditions under which each type of contract is optimal. If the agent's risk aversion and cost of effort are low, and the potential gain from his effort is high, firms optimally choose to implement a classic bonus-incentive contract. Otherwise, they offer a fixed-wage contract. This finding predicts that fixed-wage contracts should dominate in mature, low-growth firms in which agent effort does not substantially affect the expected value of the firm. In contrast, innovative high-growth firms have too much to lose from hiring an unskilled worker or a skilled worker who shirks; as such, these firms will tend to offer compensation contracts that include bonuses designed to motivate effort.
After analyzing how these tradeoffs affect the firm's optimal employment contract, we consider the effect of virtuosity on the firm's choice of projects and potential for growth. Surprisingly, we find that employee virtuosity drives firm conservatism. That is, firms are less aggressive in their choice of projects when they know that the pool of agents they hire from is highly ethical. Because virtuous agents are better matched with safer projects, firms switch from a high-risk strategy that requires incentive-based contracts and costly risk-sharing to a low-risk strategy and cheaper ethics-based contracts when the labor population's ethics improve.
We then consider the situation in which a firm must hire two agents for production. When the production technology requires cooperation between the agents (i.e., when the effort of one agent makes the effort of the second agent much more productive), the firm shies away from offering ethicsbased contracts to both agents, as little is gained from only one agent's effort. In this case, the firm optimally offers discriminatory contracts to the workers, as first proposed by Winter (2004) . That is, one worker is given a larger bonus to ensure that he always exerts high effort; since the second worker knows that the first will always exert high effort, his incentive compatibility constraint is easier to satisfy. In the paper, we show that this more hierarchical organizational structure emerges in synergy-intensive, high-growth firms. The opposite is true when the firm's production technology exhibits complementarities in effort. In this case, the firm gains a lot from the first agent who exerts effort, but much less from the effort of the second agent. The firm is then more likely to rely on the virtuosity of its agents and offer fixed-wage contracts. Indeed, bureaucratic firms that essentially require the effort of only one of its agents for successful production can offer fixed-wage contracts and hope to have at least one virtuous agent in their ranks.
Finally, we analyze how the firm's decisions change when the labor market is competitive. We consider two versions of the model: a sequential hiring game and a simultaneous hiring game. In both versions, we find that firms are more likely to abandon their use of ethics-based contracts in a competitive environment. This occurs because if one firm offers a fixed-wage contract, their rivals can screen workers for virtuosity and can "cream-skim" them away. The intuition for this result is as follows. With a fixed-wage contract, the expected utility of egoistic agents is higher than that of otherwise identical but virtuous agents. This occurs because both agents receive the fixed wage payment, but the egoistic agent does not pay the cost of effort. This drives a wedge between the reservation utility of the two types of agents and the virtuous agents become easier/cheaper to steal. A rival firm may offer an incentive contract that meets the virtuous agent's reservation utility and excludes the egoistic workers. This leaves the initial firm with egoistic agents who shirk under an ethical contract. Realizing this threat ex ante, the initial firm tends to offer only incentive contracts. Therefore, competition for skilled, scarce labor makes it less likely that virtuosity creates value in the economy.
Our work is related to that of Noe and Rebello (1994) in that we model the effects of agent ethics in the relationship between a firm and its manager. Unlike these authors, we do not assume that the utility functions of managers whose actions are guided by their ethics are any different from those of their egoistic counterparts. More specifically, all managers, virtuous or not, have the same utility function in our model. The work ethic of some agents takes the form of an implicit moral contract that leads them to do what is in the best interest of their principal. This difference, although subtle, means that agents cannot be pre-screened on the basis of their ethics, as they are identical when they face the same incentive-based contracts. In this sense, our approach to the ethical behavior of agents is closer to Rabin's (1995) approach to moral constraints which, as opposed to moral preferences (as he terms the similar utility function approach), take the form of internal constraints on the part of agents. The scope of the two papers is quite different, however, as Rabin (1995) concentrates on the impact of such constraints on the type of information that agents gather in order to make economic decisions. The way we model ethical agents as being diligent is also close to how Somanathan and Rubin (2004) model honesty in the sense that agents keep their commitments. However, the value of this commitment is assumed exogenously in their work, whereas the value of diligence emerges endogenously through contracting in ours.
Although we do not formally explore the relationship between ethics and incomplete contracting in this paper, the two concepts are potentially closely linked. Tirole (1999) argues that incomplete contracts are the product of unforeseen contingencies, the cost of writing contracts and the cost of enforcing contracts. For example, in the quest to endogenize the optimality of incomplete contracts, Dye (1985) , Segal (1999) and Battigalli and Maggi (2002) follow Williamson's (1985) transaction cost approach and show that incomplete contracts naturally emerge. Our paper serves to answer what happens or can happen when the agent is left without proper incentive bounds that complete contracts provide. The potential presence of virtuous agents who are guided by their moral standards and work ethic in the absence of economic incentives should affect the extent to which contracts remain incomplete. That is, it is possible that ethical behavior fills the gaps of incomplete contracts, as also postulated by MacLeod (1996) . In this light, the savings associated with ethics-based contracts amount to more than just the costs of suboptimal risk-sharing; they also include the cost savings of writing simpler, more incomplete contracts.
Finally, it is worth noting that the egoistic and virtuous views of the agent in his relationship with a principal have been debated in the economics literature before. A good example is the debate between Arrow (1963 Arrow ( , 1968 and Pauly (1968) about the optimality of complete insurance.
In his critique of Arrow (1963) , Pauly (1968) argues that rational agents will abuse the terms of insurance that Arrow proposes, and that this type of moral hazard renders insurance suboptimal or even impossible in the first place. Arrow's (1968) reply relies heavily on ethical standards and the morality of agents as solutions to this problem. For example, he writes that "[insurance companies] may even rely on the willingness of the individual to behave in accordance with some commonly accepted norms" (page 538) and that "the relations of trust and confidence between principal and agent are sufficiently strong so that the agent will not cheat even though it may be 'rational economic behavior' to do so" (page 538).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up our benchmark principalagent model and formally introduce the notion of a virtuous agent. We also derive the equilibrium contracts that the firm offers, first in the case where agent types are common knowledge, and then in the case where types are privately known by agents. Section 3 analyzes how a population's work ethic can affect a firm's choice of project and prospect for growth. Section 4 studies the role of work ethic when multiple agents are required and must interact for production. Section 5 studies the effect of competition on the survival of ethics-based contract. Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains all the proofs.
The Model 2.1 Firms and Agents
Consider an unlevered firm, owned by risk-neutral shareholders (the principal), which initially consists of F dollars in cash and a risky project that expires at the end of one period. The shareholders have the opportunity to hire an agent (also referred to as a manager in what follows) to potentially improve the project's expected profitability. The shareholders face an adverse selection problem because managers are either skilled or unskilled, and only a skilled agent can improve the probability that the risky project succeeds. A manager's ability (or skill) is denotedÃ, which is a ∈ (0, 1) with probability φ a and zero with probability 1 − φ a . Managers observe their own ability but cannot credibly communicate it to the firm's owners.
The shareholders also face a moral hazard problem because a manager's ability gets impounded into firm value only if he exerts effort. More specifically, the end-of-period payoff of the firm's project is given byṽ
whereẼ ∈ {0, 1} is the manager's choice of effort. As such, only skilled managers who exert an effort may increase the likelihood that the firm's project is successful. In that case, the end-of-period liquidation value of the firm is F + σ. Otherwise, it is F .
The agent's choice of effort is unobservable and therefore non-contractible. This means that the firm can only offer contracts that specify the agent's compensation in the two possible end-of-period states of the world. We denote an employment contract in this setting as the pair C ≡ {ω, β}, where the manager receives ω in the bad state (ṽ = 0) and ω + β in the good state (ṽ = σ). As such, ω is the manager's fixed wage 4 and β is a lump-sum incentive bonus if the project succeeds. We assume that the agent has no initial wealth and has limited liability, so we restrict ω and ω + β to be non-negative.
In the spirit of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and of Treynor and Black (1976) , we assume that, because the manager's human capital is less diversified than that of shareholders, he is risk-averse about the outcome of his compensation. We also assume that the manager incurs a utility cost of c > 0 when he exerts an effort. In order to keep the analysis tractable and to improve the clarity 4 Making F large enough will ensure that the fixed wage is paid in either state.
of exposition, we specify the manager's utility from a compensation contract C = {ω, β} to bẽ
where the parameter r ∈ (0, 1) captures the manager's risk aversion. Dividing the first term by (1 − r) measures how much more utility the manager gets from certain compensation versus a stochastic bonus. As r → 0, the manager approaches risk neutrality, and as r → 1, he only values the riskless portion of his compensation and so becomes infinitely risk-averse. 5 Finally, we assume that managers have a reservation utility ofū > 0, regardless of their skill. 6
Managers may also differ in their work ethic (or ethics for short). They can be virtuous (t = 1) or egoistic (t = 0) with probabilities φ t and 1 − φ t respectively. Once hired, egoistic managers respond exclusively to incentives when choosing whether or not to exert effort. That is, they only exert effort if the benefit of doing so exceeds the utility cost they must incur. Unlike egoistic agents, virtuous agents have an implicit contract with themselves to do what is expected of them once they accept the position. In other words, they always exert effort and always incur its cost. Still, like egoistic agents, virtuous agents accept to work for the firm only if the utility they can expect to receive from the offered compensation contract is at leastū, i.e., if their participation constraint is met. In making this assessment, virtuous agents account for the instances in which they expect to exert effort without proper incentives to do so, i.e., they effectively charge the firm ex ante for their expected effort choices. As with skill, agents know their own ethics but firms do not. Thus, every agent's type is a pair {Ã,t}.
Equilibrium with Observable Types
From the firm's perspective, the compensation that it pays the manager is a random variablẽ w ≡ ω + 1 {ṽ=σ} β. For simplicity, we assume that the risk associated with the potential increase in firm value is idiosyncratic and that the riskfree rate is zero. This means that the value of the firm at the beginning of the period,V , is simply F plus the expected value ofπ ≡ṽ −w, given the endogenous actions taken by the agent if he is hired by firm. Without a manager, the firm pays no wage (i.e.,w = 0) and is assumed to be unskilled (i.e.,Ã = 0), so that firm value is simplyV = F .
For the firm to consider hiring the manager, it is sufficient that σa be large enough relative to c 5 Note that this normalization does not affect any of our results, i.e., any other normalization would do. The normalization that we adopt has the advantage of keeping the analysis more tractable. 6 We assume that unskilled managers have the same reservation utility as skilled managers in order to emphasize the role of screening in our model. Screening becomes more difficult, or even impossible, as the reservation utility of unskilled managers decreases below that of skilled managers.
andū. That is, it must be the case that the contribution of the skilled agent's effort to firm value is large relative to his effort cost and reservation utility. We assume this to be the case as, otherwise, no hiring ever takes place. 7
As mentioned above, the firm does not know the agent's skill or ethics when it makes a contractual offer to him. In order to highlight the role of ethics in our model, however, we first characterize the optimal contract that the firm would offer the agent if it could observe his type. Of course, the firm would never hire an unskilled agent as such an agent can never improve the firm's value. As such, the following proposition concentrates on the skilled manager. Proposition 1. Suppose that the firm can observe the agent's type and thatÃ = a. Ift = 0, then the firm will offer an incentive-based contract C I = {ω I , β I } where ω I = (1 − r)ū and β I = c a , and the value of the firm isV
(2) Ift = 1, then the firm will offer an ethics-based contract
and β E = 0, and the value of the firm is
When the firm knows it is hiring a skilled agent, it wants to ensure that this agent exerts effort as this is the only way that the agent's skill gets impounded into firm value. The firm's problem essentially amounts to finding the cheapest way to compensate the agent and make sure that he will chooseẼ = 1. For an egoistic agent, the optimal contract involves the usual tradeoff between incentives and risk-sharing. On the one hand, the contract must provide the agent with incentives to exert effort and so must offer him a reward for a good outcome; this is why β I is strictly positive.
On the other hand, the fact that this contract transfers some risk from the risk-neutral firm to the risk-averse agent (since compensation is not the same in both states of the world) implies that risk-sharing is suboptimal and costly.
The tradeoff between incentives and risk-sharing does not apply when the firm knows it is hiring a virtuous agent. Indeed, such an agent does not require any incentives to exert effort once he accepts the position, and so there is no need for performance bonuses and their associated suboptimal risk-sharing; this is why β E = 0. This does not mean that the virtuous agent gives up surplus; instead this agent anticipates his "non-incentivized" effort and requires a larger fixed wage. This is why ω E > ω I . Ex ante, both agents expect the exact same utility, which the firm restricts to be exactlyū to meet their participation constraint. A simple comparison of (2) and (3) shows that the loss to the suboptimal risk-sharing associated with the hiring of an egoistic agent as opposed to a virtuous agent is cr. The expected extra compensation costs that the firm must incur in order to provide risky incentives are greater for agents who are highly risk-averse and for those who face a higher cost of effort.
Equilibrium with Unobservable Types
Clearly, the firm would prefer hiring a virtuous agent to an egoistic one provided that they have the same skill. Of course, in general, neither the skill or the ethics of the agent are observable to the firm. As such, the firm must use contracts to not only provide the agent with the right incentives but also to screen the ones that do not create value. In what follows therefore, we assume that the firm only knows the distribution of agent skills and ethics.
Before we derive our results, it is worth pointing out that the firm would never consider offering a potential agent any contract other than C I or C E . First, since only agents withÃ = a can add value to the firm, the firm can only hope to benefit from hiring the agent if it meets the skilled types' participation constraint, that is, it must be the case that E[ũ |Ã = a] ≥ū. Second, firm value can only be created if these skilled agents exert effort. We already know from Proposition 1 that both C I and C E achieve this in the cheapest manner for each of the two ethics types. In other words, there is no point in increasing the bonus portion while decreasing the fixed portion of either contract, as this does not increase effort but increases the loss resulting from suboptimal risk-sharing. Similarly, there is no point in decreasing the bonus portion while increasing the fixed portion of C I , as doing so will make the egoistic agent shirk. The following proposition characterizes the tradeoffs faced by the firm when it chooses the contract to offer a prospective agent.
Proposition 2. When the firm does not know the agent's skill and ethics, it offers the incentivebased contract C I as long as
Otherwise, the firm offers the ethics-based contract C E .
The tradeoff in (4) can be appreciated as follows. The two left-hand terms measure the relative benefits of an incentive-based contract (over an ethics-based contract), whereas the right-hand side measures the relative cost of such a contract. The first term on the left-hand side measures the firm's gain resulting from its ability to screen away unskilled agents who do not gain any utility from the bonus portion of the incentive-based contract. 8 With an ethics-based contract, this screening is not possible: all agents receive a fixed wage that meets their participation constraint and so there is no way to discriminate between them. As a result, the firm loses ω E = (1− r)(ū+ c) to unskilled agents when it offers C E . The second term on the left-hand side of (4) measures the extra value created by skilled, egoistic agents when the firm induces them to exert effort with the incentive-based contract C I . Such agents do not exert effort when they are hired with an ethics-based contract instead.
Finally, the right-hand side of (4) measures the loss in value due to suboptimal risk-sharing that comes with the risky bonus incentive of C I . Because the unskilled agents are screened away when the firm offers the incentive-based contract, the loss from suboptimal risk-sharing is only incurred with skilled agents; this is why φ a multiplies the loss derived earlier with observable types. Thus the firm's decision to offer an incentive-based contract as opposed to an ethics-based contract must weigh the benefits of screening and incentives against the cost of suboptimal risk-sharing.
Upon inspection of (4), it is clear that the use of incentive-based contracts increases with low r, c and φ t , and with high σ and a. If the agent has a low cost of effort (low c) and a low level of risk aversion (low r), risk-sharing is inexpensive and so ethics-based contracts are less beneficial.
If the fraction of agents available who are virtuous is low (low φ t ), then it is foolish for the firm to rely on agent ethics for value creation; instead the firm benefits from inducing effort. Finally, if the potential increase in value resulting from the agent's presence is large (high σ and high a), then not motivating a fraction of skilled agents (the egoistic ones) represents a big opportunity cost for the firm; as such, an incentive-based contract is preferred.
These comparative statics are quite instructive about the types of firms and industries that will be characterized by flatter contracts, which rely mostly on the ethics of agents. More specifically, we would expect firms in high-growth industries, where innovation is important, to offer incentivebased contracts. In contrast, firms in low-growth, mature industries should be expected to offer fixed wage contracts and rely more on the ethics of their agents. Similarly, jobs that require very skilled-specific labor will tend to come with incentive-based contracts as opposed to jobs that require general skills possessed by a large segment of the labor population. This can be seen in (4) if we decrease φ a while keeping aφ a constant.
The tradeoff derived in Proposition 2 is important in the following sections. As we will see, in one form or another, it drives the possibility for ethics-based contracts to survive the competition for scarce labor, the firm's choice of projects, as well as the set of contracts that firms will provide when multiple agents are needed for production. Because we want to focus the rest of our analysis on the effects of privately known ethics, however, we assume from now on that all agents are equally skilled. That is, we assume that φ a = 1, so thatÃ = a and an agent's type is simplyt.
Ethics, Project Choice and Growth
In the previous section, the firm had access to only one project, and its potential value σ was exogenously given. In this section, we consider what happens when the firm has access to multiple projects with various levels of reward and risk. In particular, we allow the firm to pick the project profile that puts the characteristics of the agent population it draws from to their most profitable use. Counterintuitively, we find that virtuosity leads to firm conservatism. That is, we show that if the agent population is highly virtuous, it is optimal for a firm to be conservative and choose lowgrowth, low-risk projects. The opposite holds for a firm that only has access to an agent population that is highly egoistic.
Suppose that, instead of being assigned a projectṽ described by (1), the firm must now, before hiring the agent, pick one project from a family of available projectsṽ µ indexed by µ ∈ [0, 1 − a].
For any given µ, we assume that the end-of-period payoff of project µ is 9
where σ µ is such that the mean payoff of any project is the same given that the agent exerts effort.
More precisely, we assume that E[ṽ µ |Ẽ = 1] = (a + µ)σ µ is equal to the same value, m, for all
a+µ . So, with a non-shirking agent, all available projects are equivalent ex ante in terms of their expected payoff from the firm's perspective. However, projects differ in two important (and related) dimensions: the extent of firm growth they generate when growth does occur, and the ability they give the firm to motivate the agent. For example, projects with a low µ are riskier in that they do not pay off as often at the ones that have a higher µ, but they yield a higher payoff than higher-µ projects when successful. Because of their higher risk (and the fact that they pay off less frequently when the agent does not exert effort), these projects also force the firm to offer more fixed-wage compensation to the agent for the same level of effort, as the following lemma shows. Lemma 1. If the firm chooses to undertake project µ, then it will always choose to offer the agent one of two contracts: an incentive-based contract C I (µ) ≡ {ω I (µ), β I } with
or the ethics-based contract C E of Proposition 1.
As before, there is no point for the firm to offer more bonus compensation than that needed for an egoistic agent to exert effort, as this shifts more risk than necessary from the risk-neutral firm to the risk-averse agent, and this is costly to the firm. So C I (µ) is the cheapest contract that ensures that agents of all ethical types exert effort. Since the effort of virtuous agents does not require incentives, the firm can also consider the ethics-based contract C E from before. This contract meets the participation constraint of all agents, but only the virtuous ones exert effort. As before also, the firm will choose which contract to offer for a given project µ based on the tradeoff between incentive provision and costly risk-sharing. With multiple projects to choose from, the firm now faces an additional problem: it must choose the optimal combination of project and employment contract that maximizes its value. The following proposition characterizes this decision.
Proposition 3. The firm chooses the project µ = 0 and offers the manager the incentive-based
Otherwise, the firm chooses the project µ = 1−a and offers the manager an the ethics-based contract
Condition (7) tells us that the firm will choose to be a risky growth firm (µ = 0) when agents are highly skilled (large a), have low aversion to risk (low r) and a low cost of effort (low c). More interestingly and less intuitively, it also tells us that such projects are less likely to be undertaken when the firm can rely on a highly ethical population of potential agents (large φ t ). In that case, the firm prefers the better risk-sharing properties of the ethics-based contract and accordingly chooses a project that is safer and does not depend as heavily on the agent's effort for its success. In other words, the firm chooses to rely on the effort of virtuous types as well as on the fact that the project µ = 1 − a still succeeds with probability 1 − a when the egoistic agent shirks. In short, virtuosity leads to firm conservatism.
Multi-Agent Projects and Firm Organization
In the previous sections, we considered the firm's optimal choice of employment contracts and project choice when they hire one agent to perform a task. Now, we analyze how ethics affects the firm's choices when multiple agents are hired to work towards a common goal. When agents work in teams, they not only affect each other's productivity, but also their incentives to exert high effort (Anderson and Schmittlein 1984, Holmström and Milgrom 1991) . In what follows, we consider two general types of projects: those that require a cooperative effort (synergy-intensive project) and those in which synergy is not required to create value. As we show, the proportion of ethical agents in the population and synergy required in the project drive both the employment contracts that are offered and the firm's organizational structure. 10
As in Section 2, let us consider that the firm has F dollars in cash and that it faces a project with a random payoff whose prospect can be affected by labor. Assume that the agents have known skill a, risk aversion r, cost of effort c, and reservation utilityū. To simplify the analysis, we consider that the firm must hire two agents, i ∈ {1, 2}, to implement a project 11 with payoffs given byṽ
where
represents the effort decision of agent i. As such, the prospects of the project depend both on the effort invested by the two agents and the degree of synergy required, which is parameterized by γ. When γ is high, the project requires cooperation by the agents and the effort of only one agent is worth very little to the firm. When γ → ∞,
γ tends to zero. When a second agent exerts effort, after the first one has committed to exert high effort, the gain is sizeable asẼ γ jumps to one. The opposite is true as γ → 0: the effort of one agent is enough to induceẼ = 1 2 γ to approach one, and the second agent's effort then has very little impact on the project's success.
As before, because the effort of each agent is unobservable, the compensation contracts that the firm offers each of the two agents only depend on the two possible realizations ofṽ. Thus, each agent i receives a contract C i ≡ {ω i , β i } that specifies the fixed-wage (ω i ) and bonus (β i ) portions of their compensation. The agents simultaneously accept or reject these contracts, and 10 Note that we will keep the same definition of ethics as in previous sections, although one could probably imagine that agent ethics will take on other dimensions when agents must interact. For example, see Rotemberg (1994) for a model of cooperation with altruism, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for one with fairness, or Kreps (1990) for the role of corporate culture within the firm.
11 The model could be generalized to include n agents, but would yield similar intuition.
we assume that the terms of both contracts are common knowledge to each agent when they make their decisions. As in previous sections, virtuous agents never shirk, and the firm only needs to decide whether or not to motivate egoistic agents to exert effort.
Because the effort of one agent affects the productivity of the other, the two agents effectively engage in a coordination game. As we know from standard game theory, multiple equilibria often occur in these circumstances (Bryant 1983) . In many cases, the usual definition of a Nash equilibrium allows for the two agents to either both work or both shirk. 12 In order to avoid such coordination issues, we adopt the contractual approach and equilibrium concept of Winter (2004) .
Like Winter, we assume that the firm only offers incentive-based contracts that leave the agent with no choice but to exert effort. 13 Doing so, the firm is able to avoid equilibria in which agents engage in coordinated shirking.
The following lemma defines the choice set that the firm faces when they decide what types of contracts to offer each agent. To make notation more tractable, we define the parameter e ≡ 2 −γ as the group effortẼ when only one agent exerts effort and the other does not.
Lemma 2. When choosing the contracts to offer the two agents, the firm can restrict its decision to three sets of contracts:
Two ethics-based contracts, as defined in Proposition 1.
(ii) C EI ≡ {C E , C I1 }. One ethics-based contract as defined in Proposition 1, and one incentive-based contract with
where α ≡ φ t (1 − e) + (1 − φ t )e.
(iii) C II ≡ {C I1 , C I2 }. One incentive-based contract as defined in part (ii) above, and a second incentive-based contract with
12 Note that, because virtuous agents always exert effort, these coordination issues only affect the egoistic agents in our model.
13 Winter (2004) shows that if firms use "discriminatory" contracts, they can induce all agents to exert high effort and avoid equilibria which are Pareto inferior. As such, some agents receive lower bonuses than others (are discriminated against), but this provides aligned incentives for all agents to cooperate. In Lemma 2, we outline the discriminatory contracts that are optimal for the firm.
bonus required to motivate an egoistic agent to exert an effort and otherwise uses fixed-wage compensation in order to meet the agents' participation constraint. If the firm offers both agents the same fixed-wage contract C EE , they essentially treat them as equals. In this case, the organizational structure of the firm is strictly horizontal.
In contrast, when the firm offers C EI or C II , it does not treat its agents equally. With either of these contracts, the firm has a more hierarchical organizational structure. The agent receiving a higher bonus (or a bonus at all) can be considered the "leader" in the organization, whereas the agent with flatter incentives is the "underling". With C EI , the firm induces one agent to work hard by paying an incentive bonus, but pays the other a fixed wage and relies on their virtuosity. With C II , the firm offers both agents incentives, but offer one agent a strictly higher bonus. One agent receives a bonus β I1 contingent on the project's success that gives him an unconditional incentive to exert high effort. This is precisely the incentive-based contract in C EI . Knowing that the first agent will always exert high effort, the incentive compatibility constraint for the second agent is less costly to satisfy and the bonus β I2 that is sufficient for cooperation is cheaper. The ratio of incentives in this case can be computed as
Interestingly, in contrast to Winter (2004) , it is not always the case that a larger bonus is required to motivate the first agent. In fact, it is easy to verify that a larger bonus is necessary only when γ > 1, that is, when the firm's production function exhibits synergies between the two agents. In this case, when the effort of the first agent does not increase the likelihood thatṽ = σ much, then the firm must offer him a large bonus incentive to motivate his effort. Since the second agent has a high marginal product of effort and he knows that the first agent will always exert high effort, the incentives offered to the second agent cost the firm less. The opposite is true when the firm's production function exhibit complementarities (γ < 1). In this case, the first agent's effort comes with a large boost in the probability that the project is successful and this naturally motivates the agent. Of course, then the second agent's effort does require a larger bonus.
The fact that the second agent requires a large bonus is precisely why the firm will sometimes rely on ethics-based contracts to compensate one of the two agents. When φ t is large, the firm also benefits from relying purely on the work ethic of its agents since, as before, ethics-based contracts allow the firm to save the cost of risk-sharing.
The following proposition derives the expected profits of the firm under each set of contracts and characterizes the conditions under which the firm optimally chooses the different contracts.
Proposition 4. The expected profits of the firm are
with C EE −2(1 − r)(ū + c) + σa − rc e φ t + (1 − φ t )e with C EI −2(1 − r)(ū + c) + σa − rc e 2e−(1−φt)e 2 1−e − c e (1 − φ t )(1 − e) with C II .
(11)
Define Σ ≡ σa c and define the functions Σ EI EE and Σ II EI as the value Σ for which the firm is indifferent between choosing C EE or C EI and choosing C EI or C II , respectively. Then,
Σ EI EE and Σ II EI are monotonically increasing in r.
According to Proposition 4, as the ratio of project value to the cost of effort rises ( σa c increases), the firm tends to increase the incentives that they provide their agents. Holding all else constant, when this ratio is low, the firm tends to offer both agents an ethics-based contracts. As the ratio rises, the firm offers one agent an incentive contract and if the value to the project rises sufficiently, they provide both agents incentives. Likewise, according to Proposition 4, the firm's tendency to offer more incentives is monotonically decreasing in the agents' risk aversion. With a low r, the firm offers C II , but will switch to C EI and then to C EE as r rises.
To appreciate the effect of the project convexity (need for synergy) and the agents' ethics on contract choice, we plot expressions (12) and (13) for different values of φ t and γ in Figure 1 .
There are four panels which correspond to varying levels of φ t (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7). The parameter γ is measured on the x-axis and the potential for growth Σ ≡ σa c is measured on the y-axis. As is evident from all four panels, the firm relies more on ethics as the value from effort σa decreases and the cost of effort c rises. When Σ is large, however, the firm has too much to lose when it relies of the work ethic of its agents and so it prefers to offer incentive-based contracts. Now consider the four panels in Figure 1 when γ is small (γ < 1). When a high proportion of agents is ethical (φ t = 0.7), the firm optimally chooses to offer C EE even when the growth potential of the project is high. When γ is small, it is critical that only one of the agents exerts effort. Since the agents are virtuous and risk-sharing is costly, C EE is the optimal choice for the firm. Now, if only a small proportion of the agents is ethical (φ t = 0.1), the firm will no longer rely on C EE when the growth potential Σ rises. In this case, they cannot depend on virtuosity and must provide incentives for their agents.
The most interesting aspect of Figure 1 is what happens when the level of synergy is very high (ie. γ > 5). When the proportion of virtuous agents is also high (φ t = 0.7), the firm offers its employees incentives at a relatively low Σ-threshold. Since synergy is required, the firm does not gain value when only one agent exerts effort. Therefore, the Σ-threshold at which the firm chooses C II is low. When φ t = 0.1, however, we observe a different pattern. As γ rises, the firm becomes even more likely to offer C EE . This occurs because the cost of incentives rises when the proportion of virtuous agents is low. That is, if the first agent cannot depend on the goodwill of their co-workers, then the firm must incur an extra cost to meet the agent's incentive compatibility constraint. Since this cost rises as γ rises and φ t falls, the firm will choose to offer C EE even when Σ is high.
Inspecting all four panels for γ > 1, the frontiers between the contract sets are upward sloping for φ t = 0.1 and φ t = 0.3 and downward sloping for high φ t = 0.5 and φ t = 0.7. When φ t is low, the benefits of incentives are less than the costs, especially as γ increases. In this case, the firm will offer C EE , even when the growth potential of the project is high. In contrast, when φ t is high, incentive contracts are less costly and the benefits to offering C II are strictly higher, especially as γ increases. In this case, then, the firm maximizes value by assuring that their agents exert high effort.
This analysis also has implications for the organizational structure of the firm. Based on Figure 1 , firms will have a more horizontal structure when either γ is high and φ t is low, or when γ is low and φ t is high. In those cases, the firm prefers to offer the contract C EE and both agents are treated as equals. Otherwise, if γ and φ t are both high or low, then the firm prefers to offer C EI or C II , which implies a more vertical hierarchy in the organization. Therefore, the degree to which a firm is more or less bureaucratic will depend on both the synergy required for the project and the virtuosity of the agents.
So far, we have considered the firm's choices given that they have monopoly power in the labor market. The predictions of the model may change when the labor market is more competitive, which is the subject of the next section.
Ethics and the Competition for Labor
In the previous sections, we use a standard principal-agent setup (Ross, 1973) to analyze the tradeoff between incentive-based and ethics-based contracts. The firm has complete bargaining power and extracts all of the surplus from the relationship by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent. Also, the firm is unable to use contracting as a way to screen egoistic agents from those who are virtuous, as any contract that satisfies the participation constraint of a virtuous agent also satisfies that of an otherwise identical but egoistic agent. In this section, we consider how firms optimally choose their employment contracts when they compete for labor. We show that competition makes it harder for ethics-based contracts to survive as it renders ethics screening possible. More specifically, competition makes it possible for firms to steal the agents that are virtuous.
To illustrate the effect of competition in the labor market, we first consider a sequential hiring game in which an entrant firm can potentially steal an incumbent firm's agent away. We show that entrants offer incentive-based contracts and target workers who are virtuous. That is, sequential competition offers firms the opportunity to screen for virtuous agents and "cherry pick" these employees from incumbents who rely on ethics-based contracts to compensate them. In the limit, when an entrant is sure to show up, the incumbent firm ceases to rely on ethics-based contracts altogether. This, as we show, is also the outcome of a simultaneous bidding game for the same agent. That is, ethics-based contracts never survive the competition for labor, regardless of the firms' potential for growth, the cost of suboptimal risk-sharing, or the ethical standards of the available labor population.
Sequential Hiring
We introduce an element of competition into the model of section 2 by assuming that only one agent is available and that the firm modelled in that section (the incumbent firm, firm 1) is now potentially followed by another firm (the entrant firm, firm 2) who can steal its agent. We assume that each firm j has access to a project whose payoffṽ j has the same distribution asṽ in (1) (with the appropriate subscript j forẼ, but the sameÃ = a and the same σ for both firms). We also assume thatṽ 1 andṽ 2 are independently distributed given anyẼ 1 andẼ 2 .
We assume the probability that an entrant shows up to steal the incumbent's agent to be an exogenous constant q ∈ [0, 1]. Endogenizing this quantity would require us to add a random shock to the entrant's production function (e.g., make σ 2 random and observable only to the entrant) or to make the two firms compete in the products market (e.g., makeṽ 1 negatively correlated with v 2 ). Doing so would unnecessarily complicate the analysis without affecting the economics of the model; as such, we prefer keeping q exogenous and assume that firm 1's decisions do not affect it.
The variable q can then also be interpreted as a measure of how broad the agent's skills are: if q is low, the agent's skills are highly specialized and can be productive only for a few firms; if q is high, the agent's skills are broader, and the agent can be hired to do and be productive in many jobs.
The order of play is as follows. First, as in section 2, firm 1 offers a contract to the agent, who is free to accept or reject it. 14 With probability q, a second firm enters and is free to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the first firm's agent. Until section 5.2, we assume that the first firm cannot respond with a better offer in order to persuade the agent to stay or change the terms of its contract with the agent if he does choose to stay. If no firm enters (this happens with probability 1 − q), firm 1 can keep its agent. Once the hiring game is over (i.e., once it is decided which firm the agent works for),ṽ 1 andṽ 2 are realized.
Before we characterize the equilibrium of this game, it is worth noting that, in this sequential 14 With only skilled agents, there in no screening and so the contract is always accepted by the agent in equilibrium.
game's equilibrium, the incumbent firm will never offer any contract other than C I or C E , as they are defined in Proposition 1. Indeed, because the entrant's production function is identical to that of the incumbent, it is always possible for the entrant to steal the agent by offering the same compensation contract as the incumbent. Therefore, the best that the incumbent can hope for is that no entry occurs and that the agent stays put. Thus, using the same reasoning as in section 2.3, the optimal contract must be either C I or C E . However, as we show next, the tradeoff for selecting one versus the other is different from that derived in Proposition 2. To derive the unique subgameperfect Nash equilibrium of this game, we proceed by backward induction. The following lemma characterizes the entrant's contractual offer depending on whether the incumbent's contract is C I or C E .
Lemma 3. (i) Suppose that the compensation contract between the incumbent firm and the agent is C I . Then the entrant also offers C I as long as
and offers C E otherwise. In either case, the entrant steals the agent with probability one.
(ii) Suppose instead that the compensation contract between the incumbent firm and the agent is C E . Then the entrant offers C ′ I , with ω ′ I = (1 − r)(ū + c) and
and offers C E otherwise. With C ′ I , the entrant steals the agent with probability one. With C E , it steals the agent if and only if the agent is virtuous, that is, with probability φ t .
The intuition for part (i) of this lemma is as follows. When the incumbent firm hires the agent with C I , the expected utility of the agent isū, regardless of his ethics. Indeed, by construction, this incentive-based contract exactly meets the participation constraint of the agent. As such, the problem faced by the entrant is the same as that of the firm in Proposition 2, as the agent it can hire has a reservation utility ofū, as before. This agent can therefore be stolen away from the incumbent by offering him C I or C E with any small ǫ > 0 in the fixed-wage portion of the contract.
Since ǫ can be made arbitrarily small, the resulting tradeoff between C I and C E for the entrant boils down to (4) with φ a = 1; this is (14).
Part (ii) of Lemma 3 is a bit trickier. When the incumbent firm offers the agent C E , the expected utility of the agent is different, depending on his ethical type: the virtuous agent's expected utility is E ũ|t = 1 = ω E 1−r −c =ū, whereas the egoistic agent's expected utility is E ũ|t = 0 =
That is, the egoistic agent saves on effort cost and so benefits more from the ethics-based contract.
This difference in endogenous reservation utility makes it possible for the entrant firm to steal the virtuous type only, if it is optimal for it to do so, and C E is the contract that does this in the most economical manner. 15 The alternative to stealing just the virtuous agent is for the entrant to offer a contract that will convince both ethics types to jump ship. As shown in (15), this will be the case, for example, when the opportunities for growth (i.e., σa) are so large that the entrant firm cannot rely on stealing just the virtuous type, as the probability of successfully doing so is only φ t . Because the egoistic agent's expected utility with the incumbent firm isū + c, it is expensive for the entrant firm to convince this agent to switch employer. Also, clearly, it is never optimal for the entrant firm to convince this agent to join its ranks without effort provision, so only incentive-based contracts should be considered when the entrant seeks to steal any ethical type from the incumbent. The contract that meets these requirements is the incentive-based contract C ′ I , which corresponds to C I withū replaced byū + c.
Interestingly, when it is optimal for the entrant to steal only the virtuous type, the incumbent firm is sure to be left with an egoistic agent when the entrant shows up. With C E , this agent does not work, and so the original idea of relying on the agent's ethics for effort provision backfires in this situation. This of course makes the ethics-based contract less attractive to start with for the incumbent firm. To better illustrate this, consider the expected profits of the incumbent firm:
When the incumbent firm offers the agent an incentive-based contract C I , it knows that the entrant will steal the agent, regardless of his ethical type, with probability one when entry does occur.
Moreover, because virtuous and egoistic agents exert effort and are equally productive with C I , we
and so, using (16),
Thus, as the probability of entry increases, the expected profits of the incumbent firm decrease but remain positive. This is not always the case when the incumbent firm initially offers the agent the 15 Technically speaking, the entrant firm can steal the virtuous type by offering any contract that has a bonus of β ′ E = βE + ǫ and a fixed wage of ω ′ E = ωE − (1 − r)aǫ with a small ǫ > 0. The result is obtained by making ǫ arbitrarily close to zero.
ethics-based contract C E . Indeed, when (15) is not satisfied (e.g., when φ t is close enough to one), the incumbent firm knows that only the virtuous type will leave when entry occurs. Since only the virtuous type exerts effort with C E , we have
That is, because the incumbent firm always retains the shirking, egoistic agent, E π 1 |t = 0 is negative and unaffected by the likelihood of entry. However, because the incumbent firm loses the services and effort of the virtuous agent every time entry occurs, E π 1 |t = 0 is positive and decreases with the likelihood of entry. Using (16), we have
and so, with C E , the firm can expect positive profits only if q is small enough. In particular, as entry becomes more likely, it can expect to be stuck with an egoistic agent who shirks more often.
The following proposition uses these results to further characterize the equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 5. In the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, the incumbent firm offers C I to the agent as long as
and it offers C E otherwise. If a new firm enters following C I by the incumbent, its strategy is to also offer C I if (14) holds, and to offer C E otherwise; in both cases, egoistic and virtuous agents leave the incumbent to work for the entrant. If a new firm enters following C E by the incumbent, its strategy is to also offer C E ; in this case, only the virtuous agent leaves the incumbent to work for the entrant.
Recall from Proposition 2 (with φ a = 1) that the firm offers the incentive-based contract C I to the agent when (1 − φ t )σa > cr. A simple comparison of this condition to (19) shows that the incumbent firm is more likely to offer C I as the threat of entry (q) increases. As discussed in the paragraphs preceding Proposition 5, offering C I instead of C E protects the incumbent firm from having a virtuous agent being cherry-picked by the new entrant and being stuck with an egoistic agent who shirks. Interestingly, although the entrant can follow C I by the incumbent with C I or C E depending on the size of σa, it always follows C E by the incumbent with the same contract. Indeed, because the incumbent chooses to offer the agent C E only when the benefits of this ethics-based contracts are great, it is never optimal for the entrant to follow such a contract with anything but C E , that is, (15) never holds when (19) does not hold.
As discussed previously, a low value of q can be interpreted as a situation in which the worker's skills are specialized and so are useful only to a few firms, whereas a high value of q corresponds to a situation in which the worker's skills are useful to a large cross-section of firms. In this light, (19) implies that we should observe workers with unique expertise receiving flatter compensation than workers whose skills have a wider appeal, keeping everything else equal. Indeed, when the agent's expertise is less specific, the provision of incentive-based contracts allows the firm to better protect itself from competition aimed at stealing the more virtuous agents.
Simultaneous Hiring
The sequential hiring game of section 5.1 shows how firms that use ethics-based contracts and rely on their agents' ethics for effort provision are likely to lose the very types that make such contracts successful. Of course, firms that are about to lose an agent to a competing firm can be proactive and try to retain that agent by changing the terms of their contractual relationship. This section studies the outcome of such contractual counteractions by looking at a game with simultaneous bidding by two firms for a single agent.
As in section 5.1, we assume that the agent's skill is common knowledge (Ã = a), but that his ethicst are privately known by the agent only. We also continue to assume that each firm j has some growth opportunity in the form of a project whose end-of-period payoff,ṽ j , has the same distribution asṽ in (1), and thatṽ 1 andṽ 2 are independently distributed givenẼ 1 andẼ 2 . Each firm j simultaneously offers a contract that specifies the agent's compensation in each of the two outcomes forṽ j . The agent then chooses which firm he will work for based on the utility he can expect from the two contracts. In the case of a tie, he picks either with equal probability.
In a Nash equilibrium, it will be the case that the expected profits of both firms are equal to zero; that is, the agent extracts the entire economic surplus when the firms compete for his services in this manner. Indeed, suppose that there is an equilibrium in which firm 1 (say) expects positive profits from its contractual bid, which we denote by C 1 ≡ {ω 1 , β 1 }. Because firm 2's growth opportunities are identical to those of firm 1, it could then simply offer a contract C 2 = {ω 1 + ǫ, β 1 } with an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. This would attract the agent away from firm 1 and generate positive expected profits for firm 2, breaking the equilibrium in the process. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in this bidding game.
Proposition 6. An equilibrium in pure strategies exists only if (14) holds. In that event, both firms offer the agent an incentive-based contract C C ≡ {ω C , β C } with ω C = σa − c and β C = c a . Otherwise, there is no pure-strategy strategy equilibrium.
Interestingly, there is no equilibrium in ethics-based contracts, that is, ethics-based contracts do not survive competition. Though the formal proof is in the appendix, it is instructive to see why this is the case. Suppose that in equilibrium, both firms offer an ethical contract C = {ω, β} with ω > 0 and β = 0. Each firm then gets the agent with probability 1 2 . With probability φ t , they hire a virtuous agent who exerts effort and, with probability 1 − φ t , they hire an egoistic agent who shirks. As argued in the paragraph preceding Proposition 6, for this contract to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that E[π j ] = −ω + φ t σa = 0, so it must that ω = φ t σa. Now consider the following deviation bid for firm 2 (say): C ′ = {ω ′ , β ′ } where ω ′ = φ t σa − (1 − r)aǫ and β ′ = 2ǫ with a small ǫ > 0. This contract attracts the virtuous type to firm 2 as his expected utility goes from
with firm 1 up to
with firm 2. This contract also leaves the egoistic type with firm 1, as his expected utility goes from E ũ |t = 0 = ω 1 − r = φ t σa 1 − r with firm 1 down to
with firm 2. Thus firm 2 attracts only the virtuous type from firm 1, and so its expected profits are given by
which is positive for ǫ small enough. This of course breaks the postulated equilibrium. The reason is the same as in section 5.1: ethics-based contracts give more utility to egoistic agents, making virtuous agents cheaper and easier to steal. Together, Propositions 5 and 6 imply that competition for scarce, skilled labor erodes the likelihood that firms will depend on the work ethic of agents and save the costs of suboptimal risk-sharing.
The value of a firm depends on how hard its employees work. The effort that employees invest drives both the types of projects that the firm launches (high versus low growth, high versus low risk) and the success of those projects. Without such dedication, firm value erodes. According to classic contract theory, all employees are inherently egoistic and will shirk whenever possible. As such, they work hard only if they are given incentives to do so. If their incentives become aligned with those of the firm, high effort is employed. This comes at a cost, however, as the firm incurs the costs of agency and only achieves a second-best outcome.
This paper analyzes what happens when some agents are virtuous and give their best effort without the need for extra incentives. Society does have ethical standards and people share common values. It is quite possible for managers to be diligent and have a sense of public duty. Classic contract theory ignores this possibility. If the firm hires such an agent, the traditional tradeoff between incentives and suboptimal risk-sharing no longer applies. High effort is employed as long as the firm pays the agent enough to work at all (i.e., meet their participation constraint). In this case, the agent is hired and first-best is achieved.
In general, virtuosity is private information and cannot be signaled to the firm ex ante. As such, the firm must decide to offer bonus incentives that allow it to screen unskilled agents and to motivate skilled, egoistic agents, or fixed-wage contracts that eliminate risk-sharing costs. We show that firms prefer to offer extra incentives when the risk aversion and cost of effort for the agent is low, and when the stakes of the project are high. Otherwise, the firm optimally saves the costs of risk-sharing by offering its agents a fixed-wage contract.
The tradeoffs that the firm faces also drive the types of projects that it undertakes. If agents are egoistic with low risk aversion and low cost of effort, the firm optimally becomes a high-risk growth firm. In contrast, if the firms can depend on the virtuosity of its agents, then it remains conservative and chooses low-growth, low-risk projects. This is counterintuitive as high work ethic actually leads to firm conservatism, not a tendency to take on extra risk.
We also consider the organization structure and employment contracts the firm chooses when it hires multiple employees to participate in a group effort. The organizational structure of the firm is driven by the average ethics of the labor population and by the way employees must interact within the firm. In synergy-intensive projects, it is suboptimal for the firm to depend on the virtuosity of agents. In this case, the firm offers the employees the incentives that ensure employee cooperation. In contrast, when projects do not require collaboration, firms may choose to offer fixed-wage contracts and depend on the virtuosity of its employees. Since it is not crucial for all workers to exert high effort in this case, the firm reduces its costs of agency and depends on the expected diligence of its employees.
We believe that this paper presents a plausible argument for considering the work ethic of managers as an important determinant of firm organization, project choice, and firm value. As this has been largely ignored by the previous literature on contract theory and firm organization, this paper hopefully represents a first step towards a greater understanding of the effect of corporate and societal culture on firm value. the firm does not face an incentive-compatibility constraint. Thus the firm sets β = 0 ≡ β E and
The value of the firm is
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that the firm offers C E , as defined in Proposition 1. Since E ũ|t = 1 = ω E 1−r −c =ū and E ũ |t = 0 = ω E 1−r =ū + c >ū, this contract meets the reservation utility of all agents, regardless of their skill. Thus all agents accept the offered contract, but only the skilled, virtuous agents (Ã = a andt = 1) exert a productive effort. Such agents come with probability φ a φ t , so the firm's value is
Suppose instead that the firm offers a contract C = {ω, β} with β = β I + ǫ, ω = ω I − a(1 − r)ǫ, ǫ > 0 small, and β I and ω I as defined in Proposition 1. It is easy to verify that the incentivecompatibility constraint of unskilled, egoistic agents is not satisfied. This further implies that their participation constraint is not met either as
The participation constraint of unskilled, virtuous agents is also not satisfied as
Thus, for any ǫ > 0, it is the case that unskilled agents are screened by the firm. By letting ǫ go to zero, we conclude that C I = {ω I , β I } succeeds in screening unskilled agents, and so the firm is without a manager with probability 1 − φ a ; in that event, the firm's value is F . With probability φ a , the manager is skilled and we know from Proposition 1 that the firm's value is given by (2).
When the firm offers C I therefore, its value is given bȳ
Comparing (24) and (25), it will be the case that the firm will offer C I as long as (4) holds, and C E otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 1
For any given project µ ∈ [0, 1 − a], we can follow the same steps as in the proof of Propositions 1 and 2 (with φ a = 1). Since the egoistic agent's effort adds a probability a to the project being successful and since his effort costs him c in utility, the cheapest contract C = {ω, β} that meets this agent's incentive constraint has β = c a . His participation constraint requires that E ũ |Ẽ = 1 = ω 1 − r + (a + µ)β − c = ω 1 − r + cµ a ≥ū, and so the firm sets ω = (1 − r) ū − cµ a . With this contract, both types of agents exert effort. If instead the firm chooses a contract C = {ω, β} that will only have virtuous agents exert effort, it is cheapest to set β = 0. The virtuous agent's participation constraint is met as long as E ũ |Ẽ = 1 = ω 1 − r − c ≥ū, and so the firm sets ω = (1 − r)(ū + c).
Proof of Proposition 3
We know from Lemma 1 that, for any project µ ∈ [0, 1 − a], the firm will offer one of two contracts: C I (µ) or C E . With C I (µ), the firm's expected profits are given by
Since this quantity is decreasing in µ, the best project to associate with the incentive-based contract 
With C E , the firm's expected profits are given by E[π] = −ω E + (σ µ − β E )(aφ t + µ) = −(1 − r)ū − c + m + cr − (1 − φ t )am a + µ .
Since this quantity is increasing in µ, the best project to associate with the ethics-based contract C E is the one with µ = 1 − a. In this case, (28) reduces to
Therefore, the firm will offer C I and pick project µ = 0 when (27) exceeds (29), which is equivalent to (7). Otherwise, it will offer C E and pick project µ = 1 − a.
Proof of Lemma 2
(to be added later)
To economize on notation, let us denote 1 2 γ by α with the understanding that α < 1 2 corresponds to synergistic efforts (γ > 1) and α > 1 2 corresponds to complementary efforts (γ < 1). With C EE , the agents exerts effort only if they are virtuous, and so the firm's expected profits are given by E[π] = −2ω E + σa φ 2 t · 1 + 2φ t (1 − φ t ) · α + (1 − φ t ) 2 · 0 = −2(1 − r)(ū + c) + σaφ t φ t + 2(1 − φ t )α .
With C EI , the agent with C I1 always exert effort whereas the agent with C E exerts effort only if he is virtuous. The firm's expected profits are therefore given by E[π] = −ω E − ω I1 + (σ − β I1 )a φ t · 1 + (1 − φ t ) · α = −(1 − r)(ū + c) − (1 − r) ū − cφ t α e + σa − c e φ t + (1 − φ t )α = −2(1 − r)(ū + c) + (1 − r)c 1 + φ t α e + σa − c e φ t + (1 − φ t )α = −2(1 − r)(ū + c) + σa φ t + (1 − φ t )α + c e e + φ t α − φ t − (1 − φ t )α − rc 1 + φ t α e
With C II , both agents are provided with incentive-based contracts, and so they both always exert 
(i) Suppose that the incumbent firm (firm 1) has offered C I to the agent. This means that the agent's expected utility, regardless of his virtuosity, is equal toū, and so the entrant firm (firm 2) can steal him by offering any compensation contract that yields any positive amount of extra expected utility, however small. In other words, the entrant solves the exact same problem as in Proposition 2, and thus always ends up hiring the agent (since there are no unskilled agents any longer). The condition for offering C I over C E is therefore given by (4) which, with φ a = 1, reduces to (14).
(ii) Suppose now that the incumbent has offered C E to the agent. In this case, the expected utility of the virtuous agent is E ũ |Ẽ = 1 = ω E 1 − r − c =ū, and that of the egoistic agent is E ũ |Ẽ = 0 = ω E 1 − r =ū + c.
Because these numbers are different, the entrant firm can choose to attract the virtuous agent only by offering a compensation contract that yields at leastū but less thanū + c in expected utility to the virtuous agent. From Proposition 1, we know that the cheapest way to achieve this is with C E .
Because the egoistic agent then stays with the incumbent, the probability that the entrant steals an agent is φ t , and it always ends up with a virtuous one when it does. Its expected profits are therefore given by E[π 2 ] = (1 − φ t )(0) + φ t (−ω E + σa) = φ t σa − (1 − r)(ū + c) .
The entrant firm can also choose to attract both ethics types (i.e., attract an agent with probability one). Again, it could do so with an ethics-based contract or with an incentive-based contract.
Doing so with an ethics-based contract is useless, however, as egoistic types always shirk with such contracts, and so there is then no point in attracting them. The incentive-based contract that steals an egoistic agent from the incumbent and ensures that he exerts effort is the same as that 
The entrant will therefore choose to attract both types when (34) exceeds (33), and it straightforward to show that this is equivalent to (15).
For the incumbent firm, the decision to offer C I or C E amounts to a comparison of (17) and (18), using the fact thatπ I = −ω I + (σ − β I )a = σa − (1 − r)(ū + c) − cr, π 1 E = −ω E + σa = σa − (1 − r)(ū + c), and π 0 E = −ω E = −(1 − r)(ū + c).
It is straightforward to show that (17) exceeds (18) as long as (19) holds. The rest of the proposition follows from Lemma 3 as it is easy to show that, when (19) does not hold (i.e., the incumbent offers C E ), then (15) does not hold either (i.e., the entrant follows by offering C E as well).
Proof of Proposition 6
